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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah

MAMIE URE BAKER,
P lain.tif f,
vs.

RICHARD MILLS BAKER,
Defenda;nt.

STATEMENT OF FACTS:
The Statement of Facts found in appellant's brief
being merely an argumentative recital of a part of the
matters here involved, requires furiher statement from
us. We shall not include here discussion of evidentiary
matters which must necessarily be gone into in subsequent argument and should be referred to ,there to
avoid repetition. To understand exactly what took
place here, elaboration of the·issues made and the action
of the Court is requisite :
Appellant signed January 22nd, 1949 an affidavit
in which she recited the provisions of the original decree
as to support money, and averred (Tr. 040-1) that
$300.00 thereon then was due and not paid to her. Order
to show cause on this issued February 3rd, 1949 (Tr.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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038) and Respondent on February 28th, 1949 made his
return (Tr. 034 to 037)-it appears out of order in the
transcript), to which appellant filed a responsive pleading, denominated a "reply" on April 4th. Issues were
made by the return of respondent and the ''reply'' of
appellant, the respondent admitting everything contained in the initial affidavit, except that $300.00 was
due from him, and making a confession and avoidance
plea as to that. We will refer, so far as the pleadings
go, only to matters nec.essary for understanding of facts
in dispute, since the court's findings and judgment cover
the unquestioned matters.
Respondent pleaded in exoneration of the claim for
past due support moneys that appellant had taken the
children, about November 24th, 1948, to Oregon, with
intent to make it her permanent abode, that he had on
prior occasions sought and been refused the privilege
of taking his children to see his mother, on her birthday, and during her last illness, and had been refused;
and pleaded that appellant thereby was in contempt of
the court, and that he believed she was without right to
demand payment of the past due support money. He
charged her acts to have been done for the purpose of
preventing him from seeing· the children.
To these allegations, appellant admitted the removal to Oregon, said she had done so because she had
sol~ her Utah property and acquired a home at Nyssa,
contended she never refused him permission to visit the
children at any time, but that he had wanted to take
them away from the house which she would not permit;
alleged a controversy_ over how long the children might
be kept away in the late November occasion when he
2
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requested that they might v-isit his mother with him, his
statement at that time that he would pay no more support money, that she took the children out the ne·xt
morning ''to avoid trouble''; that when he came that
morning he had cursed and threatened her mother.
Mrs. Baker said that defendant was subject to fits
of rage and anger, made ''unusual and unjust'' demands
in his treatment of the children; that his visits upset
them and made them ill. She then denied that her
motive in taking them t~ Oregon was to deprive him
of the right of visitation, and said:
''That under the conditions that now exist, it is
absolutely nec-essary that plaintiff retain her
residence in the State of Oregon; that her closest
friends live there and that her children by a former marriage have established their homes there ;
that she is in a better position at her present
residence to support herself than she would be in
Ogden or Weber County, and that the children
of the parties are better off at their present
residence, and it is for their best interests that
they remain where they are.''
Issue also was made in a minor key as to what ef-·
feet the destruction by fire of Salt Lake property respondent had retained under the decree bad upon his
ability to pay:
On the contested matters between the parties, the
Court found generally for respondent, in substance find-

.

mg:

That the appellant had not afforded Mr. Baker
a reasonable and proper opportunity to visit with his
childr~n at any time since- the divorce, either she or

3
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some adult member of her family always being present
on such visits, and making them awkward and uncomfortable; that she had made preparations to leave some
lime prior to the incidents of late November, having sold
her local property and bought the Nyssa home before
those incidents arose and that by her actions including
the change of residence, she had wilfully deprived respondent of opportunity to see his children;
Further· that she intended to stay permanently at
Nyssa with the children, had visited Ogden three times
since leaving without bringing any of them along; that
the children had not suffered by reason of the non-payment of the support moneys but that appellant had been
forced to provide for them from her own means; that
respondent's employment was such that it would cost
him at least $100.00 in time lost from work and expenses to visit the children at Nyss~.
Findings go into the matters respecting disputes
over taking the children to see the dying grandmother
at length; the court finding a conversation to have been
had as to appellant's right to receive support moneys
while denying respondent his requests as to visitation.
The court found respondent's financial condition to be
materially worse than at the time of the decree.
The decree of the Court provided (a) that appellant
was in contempt of the Court for her action in wilfully
depriving respondent of his right of visitation given in
the original decree, and as a penalty, deprived her "of
the right to enforce payment by defendant of the sums
accruing upon support moneys, under the terms of such
4
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

decree, from November 25th, 1948 to the end of February, 19-!9, amounting to $350.00"; (h) modified the decree by redur.ing the total monthly payments of support
money to $60.00, directing respondent to pay all past
due at that rate from .lliarch 1st, and (c) made specific
directions as to the character and nature of visitation
rights to be given respondent, both at Ogden and Nyssa,
prescribing length of time, numbers permitted, and particularly requiring that on such occasions neither plaintiff nor any of her relatives should be present.
Some inaccuracies occur in appellant's statement of
facts as to figures, and misstatements of the evidence,
not worth going into here.
STATEMENT OF POINTS:
The argument in this case will follow the points below given, which seem to respondent more adapted to
develop the issues in this case than the outline used in
appellant's brief. Due reference to appellant's points
will be made.
Point No.1. The Court properly rejected the proposed
findings, conclusions and decree submitted
by appellant.
Point No. 2. The Court had power to punish such conduct as contempt, and deprivation of appellant of the right to enforce her judgment
for past due installments was a proper
penalty, within the discretionary power of
the Court.
Point No. 3. Reduction of future installments of support
moneys was within the dis-cretionary power

5
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of the Court under the changed circumstances occasioned by removal of the children from Utah.
Point No. 4 Monetary loss to Appellant resulting from
the court's orders is not objectionable as a
withholding of moneys of the children.
Point No. 5. The Court was not required to deny respondent relief because of default in payments due from him.
Point No.6. The Court rightly denied appellant's request for modification of the decree to permit continued residence in Oregon, and
was not requir,ed to afford her an opportunity to purge herself of contempt.
Point No.7. The Court properly rejected testimony on
matters previously litigated and determined.
Argument upon such matters follows.
Point 1. THE COURT PROPERLY REJECTED THE
PROPOSED FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS
AND DECRE:E SUBMITTED BY APPELLANT.
Since appellant has not seen fit to assign in detail
the matters which she claims were erroneously found
by the Court, and those in which the Court should have
found as she proposed, and did not make a finding, we
are left to her argument to determine in what particulars
her objections apply. Analysis of the differences between the two sets of findings and of the supporting
evidence seems not necessary in other particulars. The
6
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arguments "~hich appellant makes emphasize that principally she objects to the failure of the Court to agree
'Yith her claim that her motive in taking· the children to
Nyssa from Ogden 'Yas as she claimed in her pleading responsive to the return made by ~Ir. Baker, in which she
said:
'• She did not take said children with the desire
of preventing- the· defendant from visiting them,
but because she had disposed of all her property
in Utah and acquired a residence in Nyssa, so
that it was necessary for her to change her residence'',
And the claims which she makes, at various parts of
the brief, running to the same point, of which we instance:
''There is no claim that the welfare of the children is not promoted through the chang·e of residence to Oregon", (Br. 3).
"When it appears that the move was for the best
interests of the children''. ( Br. 4.)
''The removal of the children-was a reasonable
exercise of the right of control by the appellant.
She acted as the best good of the children required." (Br. 12)
And because the Court made no order requiring
appellant to return to Utah with the children, it is assumed that the Court must have determined that the
welfare of the children so required. (Br. 9, 13, 14, 23,
26.)
The issues on this disputed matter having been
found for the respondent by the Court, we will examine
the record of appellant's ad:rnlssions by pleading, and
7
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in testimony, as well as any undisputed pleading and
evidence from respondent to see how far the record supported the Court's determination. It is admitted, as
we have noted in our Statement of Facts, that Mrs.
Baker left with the children, about November 25th, 1948,
shortly after an occasion when respondent had requested
permission to take the children to see his dying mother
on the following day: She was gone when he came there,
she says he was not seen there again with the children.
Prior to that time she had already sold her Utah property and bought the property in Nyssa. At Nyssa she
had two daughters by a former marriage and other relatives and friends. The record of visitations between respondent and his children after the divorce has been
noted. On these points :
Just what was said by Mrs. Baker as to the reasons
for her secret, furtive departure from the state with
the children~ That she apprehended that it was contrary to rights existing under the divorce decree is
evident from her statement: (B. of E. 20):
"If I had been given time, I would have got a
court order to go there.''
An explanation of her meaning as to time is given in her
direct testimony a.s follows:
''No, only he made it so miserable for us. We
decided that when my daughter here she got a
place, we just pulled out and left him, after he
had kicked up such a fuss against us, threatened
my mother, threatened to knock her block off, one
thing and another.'' (B. of E. 27).
Later on cross examination, she was asked what she
meant a.s to getting a court order, but answered instead,
repeating this excuse:
8
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''Well I don't really know what I had in mind.
I just made up my mind I was going to get out
of here as soon as I could. I couldn't stand his
abuse-when he started on my mother I made up
my mind." (B. of E. 30}
These threats, appellant's only explanation of he-r
bolting '""ith the children, 'Yere made as she pleads (Trs.
043) after she had left the home with the children, so
her evidence in pure hearsay. The mother was not
called to testify. Respondent denied any threats, except
(B. of E. 37) that he told Mrs. Baker's mother that
''he ought to call the cops and send them after them''
when he found his children missing-hardly one warranting flight unless the fugitive intended to abscond from
the state.
That such removal had its motive in a desire to
separate the children from any contacts with their father
seems clear. True she denied that she had attempted
to estrange the children from their father (B. of E. 24)
but she testified (B. of E. 22) that on the visits respondent always raised a disturbance, that whenever he came
to visit, she or her mother remained in the room (B. of
E. 31), that he had told her mother (B. of E. 30), when
she interfered in an argument between the parents as
to the children ''to keep out of it'', that her own temper
was quick and (B. of E. 31) she" got riled up", so that
his visits were ever the cause of a contention which the
children heard, and didn't like, respondent on such occasions losing his temper and using profane language.
Mr. Baker testified (B. of E. 35) as to this that
Mrs. Baker's mother ''stayed in there like a cop'' every
time he visited, listened to what was said, and that he
9
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resented it, but that he had not called names and (B.
of E. 36) had been very careful of his conduct at all
of his visits. He did not deny that the visits were the
oceasion for continual contention between himself and
Mrs. Baker and the latter's mother.
As to the effect of all this on the children, Mrs.
Baker testified :
''They would just stand and look a.t him. They
don't seem to know what to do. He never gave
gave them any love before, they cannot very
well go to him now. He misses them, he naturally misses them, but they haven't any love there.
I don't know how they could have." (B. of E. 27)
''He made them nervous and irritable, because
he started a row with me on account of taking
them out.-He always wanted to take them out
so as to be able to get a picture, he would have
some silly thing like that." (B. of E. 22).
It seems not to have occurred to this custodian
that espionage upon her ex-husband's visits to his children would result in just what he saw. Children do not
show their affection to the parent who had left the home
while under the watchful eye of the parent who has
control over their lives. Of course, they didn't ''know
what to do'' and ''would just stand'' there. Appellant
saw, in the attempts of respondent to get his children
out door, where they might talk without restraint, and
his wanting to ''get a picture'' just some ''silly thing''.
Her true attitude towards his visits, her belief that
they were useless as well as bothersome, her callous
attitude towards the father's yearnings for his children
are illustrated by this, a.s well as by her testimony that
on her last visit to Ogden, as well as on her previous

10
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t'Yo, she had not brought the children (B. of E. 29) because "Then she asked if they wanted to come, they had
said they did not; and also by her statement (B. of E. 25)
that she 'Yould be "Tilling to have him call and visit
them, ''in the presence of some one else.''
Not only does this attitude throw light upon the
reasons for her taking the children from the state, it
tends to negative her excuse that the welfare of her
children is the reason for her taking, and keeping the
children in Oregon.
Her only direct testimony, on this point (B. of E. 23)
IS,

''Well they are close to the school's activity and
they are happy. They weren't happy with him.
They don't even know that he exists.''
She then gave an affirmative response to a question if the children were happier in Nyssa that in Ogden.
There is no evidence that the schools in Nyssa are
more accessible, nor better equipped as to staff or facilities than those left behind in Ogden. No considerations of healthier climate are urged. No special facilities for the education, the moral upbringing or any
other phase of life which would make Nyssa better for
the children appears. The only change in the atmosphere surrounding them of any note is the inability of
respondent to see them often. True, when Mrs. Baker
sold her property in Utah and bought the Nyssa home,
it became very much to her interest to change her residence,-but the motive for her sale and purchase still
is rooted in the desire to get the children away from
the vicinty of the respondent.

11
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Where weighty considerations of the welfare of
children exist, they take precedence over convenience
of visiting by parents who have- not custody, but the
right of visitation is a very important right, it sounds
not only in the natural affections of parents, but in the
fact that parenthood is not a matter for one sex only,
and that children can learn much from both of their
progenitors. Such a right yields only to ''the most
compelling and exceptional circumstances'', (Williams
v. Williams, 148 So. 358), giving reasons why the welfare
of the children must he first considered. And its violations, as we shall see, is one which may give rise to loss
of custody, a. well as punishment for contempt.
We think the record supports the Court's findings
as the matters essential to the disposition of this dispute.
The foregoing cover the general objection (Br. 27')
to the findings as a whole.
The remaining objections made under appellant's
Point VII are easily disposed of.
She complains tha.t Finding No. 5 is not materialthis relates at detail changes in his financial condition
to entry of the decree. It was on matter of facts, put
at issue by the pleadings. ( (Tr. 036-043). The Court
was entitled to find on it.
She charges that Finding No. 4 is not supported
by the testimony. More examination of the evidence
(B. of E. 2, 9, 12, 13 and 14) shows tha.t not true, and
conditions surrounding employment of a railroad brakeman are sufficiently a matter of general lrnowledge so
that we submit that any re-asonable person would know
the finding to speak the truth.

12
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The Conclusions of La\v are all attacked: We
admit that the first conclusion, based on the first finding and ruling in accordance therewith, that respondent
".,.as not in contempt because appellant had ·not charged
him \\Tith it in her pleading·, is not fortunately worded,
but appellant admits in her proposed finding (Tr. 049)
that, when that finding- \Yas submitted, these sums had
been paid. And, as \Ye shall see, his default in payments
is not a material factor in this case. The other conclusions are supported by the finding·s, and are within
the discretion of the trial judge.
Appellant does not point out in what respect
decree is not supported by the evidence, save as
has raised the point in prior argument, and we do
seem called upon to analyze that matter further.
submit that this point is not well taken.

the
she
not
We

POINT No. 2: THE COURT HAD POWER TO PUNISH SUCH CONDUCT AS CONTEMPT, AND DEPRIVATION OF
APPELLANT OF THE RIGHT TO
ENFORCE HER JUDGMENT FOR
PAST DUE INSTAL.LMEN'TS WAS
A PROPER PENALTY, WITHIN THE
DISCRETIONARY POWER OF THE
COURT.
Appellant unde-r her Point II argues that the decree, p·roviding for visitation ''at reasonable times and
places'' was not breached by her acts, because that
decree did not affirmatively forbid taking the children
from the state and was too indefinite and uncertain on
that point for its breach to be punished as contemptuous.

13
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We concede that if the meaning of a decree is doubtful under a fair construction, a. court may well hesitate to impose a. penalty for a claimed breach, particularly where the consequences of adjudging contempt
to have occured might be serious. Just such a. case was
In Re Vaughan, (87 So. 792), which appellant cites,
quoting at length (A. Br. 9) in her brief. The language
quoted taken in its context, makes it obvious that the
Court considered tha.t the mother might. well have
thought, having remarried, her new husband a resident of another state, that the right of visitation might
be ''within her proper control'' if given at. her new
home, so that the decree, with that proviso, was not
sufficiently definite to make her conduct a wilful breach
of its terms-nor does the Court rest on that but
expresses its doubt that, even if in contempt, she should
be prohibited from defending an attempt to take the
custody of the child from her.
We do not say that there is not found language in
decisions which seems to require an express prohibition against removal from the state before that removal
is eontemptuous. The text books. reflect some uncertainty in this field:
''While the cases are not in complete accord, it
appears generally to be the rule that if a wife is
guilty of violating the provisions of an agreement
between her husband and herself as to the custody
of the children, the husband is relieved from making further payments for the support of such
children, whether such payments are provided for
in the agreement between the parties, or have
been adopted in a subsequent decree of divorce-.
As in the case of the violation of the provisions

14
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of aJl agreement, the authorities are not in agreement as to the effect of a violation by the former
\Yife of the provisions of a divorce decree in respect of the custody of children on her right to
recover payments provided by the decree for the
support of the children.'' 17 Am. J ur. 536; Sect.
705.
Close examination of other cases cited by appellant
upon this point detracts from their weight as authority.
Much reliance is placed upon the Vaughan case (supra)
and upon
Barnes v. Lee (Ore.) 275 Pac. 661, (Appl. Br.
10-11)

Campbell v. Campbell, 37 Wis. 206, (Appl. Br.
11-12)

yet the first, on close analysis, is very weak authority,
and the second seems to support respondent ,and not
appellant.

Lee, in the Oregon case, having won custody of a
child in an Oklahoma divorce, with rights of custody
reserved in the mother, came to Oregon with it. The
mother, upon that ground, procured modification by the
Oklahoma decree, giving her custody; and brought
habeas corpus in Oregon. The court determines : (a)
That the Oklahoma decree was "not entitled to full faith
and credit so far as the question of custody is concerned;" (b) that "on the real question in the ease, as
to what would be best for the interests of the child" the
trial court rightly determined that it should remain in
the father's custody, and with "the real question" disposed of (c) said : ''There wa.s no diso bediance of the
order of the Oklahoma court in bringing the child with
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him, so long as there was no provision in the order that
she was not to be taken from the state.'' Citing Stetson
v. Stetson, (Me.) 15 A. 60, 61.
This last statement for which appellant cites it, is
only dictum-since the case had previously been ruled
on the first two grounds given-but the citation on
which the Court relied shows that no real consideration
had been given the question, and that the statement is
uninformed dictum. For the Stetson case merely decides
that, under a Maine statute, a trial court may place
custody of the child of divorced parents in a non-resident
custodian if its best interests demand, and the language
relied on has reference to the Maine statute only.
The Campbell ease says. that the decree, not expressly prohibiting the custodian mother from removing
the child from the state, she was not "in strict contempt"
in so doing. Just what is ''strict contempt'' does not
appear there·, nor ean we find a. definition of it. It
would seem the court must have meant some contempt
for which no excuse might be received, for it goes on
then to consider her c.onduct, says that the terms. of the
decree "fairly implied" that the father had been
adjudged the right to make visits on his child at Milwaukee, the common domicile, chides the mother for
' 'vindictively' ' telling him that he could see the child in
Chicago; then points out that the child was sickly, that
by removing it to Chicago, where she could give it better
care, she had been able to nurse it back to health and
doubtless had saved the child's life, and adds:
"We must say that. the necessities which pressed
upon her and which she now pathetically pleads
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for her conduct go Yery far to redeem he·r removal of the child from the implication of wanton
disregard of her duty to the Court and the appellant.''
Without laboring the point too much, this seems good
authority for the Yiew·· that such a removal of the child
from the jurisdiction, "'"here the decree fairly implied
that visits should be had, would have been wanton disregard of duty to the court-not a bad definition of contemptuous conduct-had it not been for the overbalancing excuse that it saved the child's health and perhaps
its life.
Examination of other cases cited by appellant under
either Point II or IV, does not aid her contention. Those
cases generally establish some point not here in dispute:
For example:
In Kane v. Kane, (1Iich.) 216 N.W. 438, the precise
question raised in Stetson v. Stetson appeared. The
father, under arrest in Windsor, Ontario, for non-support, jumped his bail, fled to Detroit, and four years
later sued for divorce there. The mother crossed the
river, defended, won custody and support money. The
father appealed-his claim that a Michigan court lacked
jurisdiction to order payment of support money to the
non-resident custodian of a non-resident minor. The
decision accurately states the law as to non-resident
custody:
"Where p·roofs are convincing the welfare of the
child demands the course taken, its custody may
and should be awarded the non-resident parent
notwithstanding the effect may be to defeat
visitation by the resident parent.''
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We submit the proofs in the instant ease were
neither ·Convincing nor did they show a state of affairs
which ''demanded'' defeat of the respondent's right of
visitation.
Other cases cited to this point were Bedolfe v.
Bedolfe, (127 P. 594), a Washington case, and Waldref,
v. Waldref, (159 N.W. 1068) a Minnesota ease. The Waldref ease held that a father who had deserted his family,
been divorced without rights of visitation reserved,
could not insist on a modification giving him rights of
visitation where the evidence indicated that such visits
would he detrimental to the health of one of the children.
The eourt in the Bedolfe ease, where the decree provided
for visitation at ''reasonable times during reasonable
hours of the- day'', said that the language was susceptible
to interpretation as requiring that the child .should be
kept in the jurisdiction of the c.ourt of divorce-; notes
without passing on the matter that the lower court_ did
not so interpret the decree, and determines that the
welfare of the child would not be- subserved by returning
it to its Washington residence, with the maternal grandmother, but warns the father's parents, where it was
staying in Oregon, that they must treat the mother,
when visiting the- ehild, with civility under pain of loss
of custody, or of ·contempt proceedings against the
father.
Before presenting cases supporting our position,
let us point out again the fundamental error appellant
makes in her argument as to the penalty imposed upon
her. The Court in this case did not in any wise modify
the decree to eliminate past due installments of support
moneys or alimony-the gist of appellant's Point III.

18
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

The Court's action is correctly stated in these terms:
.A.s a penalty for her continuing· contempt, it withheld
from her the right she had asked, to use the enforc.ement po"\YL~rs of the C~ourt to obtain that money from
respondent. In effect it said: While you are in contempt, you may not come into this Court and seek to
enforce rig·hts, other,Yise yours to enforc.e, under suc.h
decree. Our cases generally are based on the rule stated
next below.
~~A parent who has been denied the right to visit
a child, as provided in a decree of divorce, may
apply to the Court of first instance for a modification of the decree, or for a rule to show cause
"\Yhy he or she should not be punished for contempt. A divorced wife who refuses to permit
a child to visit its father as provided by decree
is not entitled to the aid of the court in collecting
alimony until she has c·omplied with the decree,
or offered to do so in good faith.'' 17 Am. J ur.
516.

In Eberhart v. Eberhart, (189· N.W. 592) the Minnesota decree provided only for reasonable rights of
visitation. After the mother with custody had taken the
children from the state, p-roceedings of the· same charac.ter had here arose. The eourt held, the Supreme Court
affirming, that the mother might not have the aid of
the court to enforce her claims for past due payments
of support money and relieved the father from the payment of installments thereof subsequently accruing during the absence of the children from the· state.
In Combs v. Combs, (162 Pac. 273) upon a finding
of removal of the child, by the mother with custody,
from the county of residence, and that she had obstructed
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and prevented the father from having the- opportunity
to visit the- child ''at reasonable times and places'' the
Kansas Court affirmed a modification of the decree
which placed custody in the father, and to a suggestion
as to absence of evidence to show the mother to be an
unfit person to have -custody continued in her, said:
''There was evidence to support another ground
of the motion-that the plaintiff had 'obstructed
and prevented the defendant from seeing said
child or having an opportunity to visit with him
at re-asonable times and places'. Disobedience of
the original decree naturally worked a modification thereof. ' '
A result substantially similar to that which appellant thinks happened here is found in Weinbaum v.
Weinbaum (153 Atl. 303.) where the Rhode Island decree granted the father the right, so long as he was
resident in that state, to visit the child "at reasonable
times and places.'' The mother took the child to Florida,
the father withheld some of the payments of support
moneys due from him, and the mother returning to the
jurisdiction cited him in for non-payment. It was held
that, having placed it out of her power to perform tha.t
part of the decree affecting her, she was entitled to no
moneys during the period she kept the child out of the
state.
Distance, as well as questions of jurisdiction come
into such cases, and it is obvious that here, had Mrs.
Baker taken the children to some Nevada town at the
other end of Mr. Baker's run, his complaint as to the
hindrance upon his rights she imposed -by changing her
residence would have little weight. It the case of In
Re Hipple (256 Pa.c. 1015), the Kansas court found a
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move from Hutchinson to Wichita-about as far as
from Og-den to Provo,-improper. It evidently considers the rause of the removal to be the greater facility afforded the mother in resisting visitation by her
husband.
Where the divorce decree rontained no provision
for visitation by the father, in Th!eyers v. Meyers, (126
N. W. 8-!1) it appeared that the parties had stipulated
as to custody, reserving· a rig·ht of visitation in the
father, that provision having been omitted by her counsel in preparing the decree. The father discontinued
payment of support moneys when the wi~e took the
children from the state. Upon like proceedings to those
here, he pleaded deprivation of visitation, the omission of the provision from the decree, and asked modification to show his right, and relief against payment
during deprivation of that right. The Court refused
to enforce payment of past due installments, modified
the decree to strike out all provisions for subsequent
payments, and provided that upon the mother return..
ing the children to the state, she might ask for modification restoring the support moneys.
In Williams v. Williams, (148 So. 358) where the
husband had been required by the Mississippi divorce
decree to pay off a mortgage on the wife's home, and
attorney's fees, had paid $120.00 on the mortgage and
$50.00 on the fees, he requested with his last remittance the child be permitted to visit with him at his·
home-the decree giving that right to him '' a.t reasonable times and intervals''. The request not being compplied with, he renewed it. Upon further non-compliance, believing that if the other amounts due from
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him were paid, any subsequent request for a visit from
the child would be ignored, he deposited installments
falling due from him in a bank, until substantially all
due was so deposited, the hank then failing and the
moneys being lost. Upon a petition that he be required
to pay the sums accrued, or be adjudged in contempt,
it was held,
''One party may not successfully call upon the
other to perform the· duties and obligations imposed upon the latter, unless the petitioning
party shows that, on his or her part, he or she
has done those things which the contract or deeree requires of him or her, or else presents
and substantiates. such a complete and well
founded excuse that the petitioner's default may
for the time he postponed or substituted; and the
case, when an excuse will he received and the
other party nevertheless required to perform, will
be rare and under the most compelling and exceptional c.ircumstances.-We are of the opinion
that she is not entitled to invoke the aid of the
Court, and the decree will be reversed and her
petition dismissed, without prejudice to a renewal when the required conditions have been
complied with, or there has. been a. real offer in
good faith to do so."
In Harris v. Harris, (189 N.Y.S. 215) when the
wife, who under a decree of separation had custody of
the child, went with the child to Nevada to obtain a divorce, the Court held that she was not entitled to invoke
the power of the court in c.ontempt proceedings to enforee payments of moneys which had accrued under the
separation decree, so long as she remained without the
state in defiance of the terms of that decree.
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In another New York case, Sch,veig v. Sc.hweig, (107
N.Y.S. 905), the mother 'vho lived in Pittsburg at the
commencement of the action had obtained an order for
support moneys pendente lite, the order requiring her
to haYe the child in N e"~ York City twice a week for a
Yisit "'"ith its father. She did not comply, neither did
he. The Appellate Court reversed an order permitting
him to withhold payment so long as s4e failed to afford
the rights of visitation, but on the purely procedural
ground that she had not been adjudged by the lower
court to be in contempt for defeating, impairing or prejudicing a right or remedy of a party in the litigationand certainly the court would have been well justified
in so adjudging under her admitted conduct.
The Florida Supreme Court held in Van Loon v.
Van Loon (182 So. 205) a case cited by appellant under
her point III, that strong equitable reasons, rising out
of radically changed circumstances, might authorize
a court to refuse to enforce its decree by contempt or
ne exeat proceedings, even though all power to change or
modify it had been lost by reason of the installments
having accrued and the right thereto become vested.
In square opposition to Lee v. Barnes, (supra) we
call attention to St. E'cx: rei Nipp, v. District Court, 128
P. 590, a Montana case, where, after a divorce in Omaha,
with ea.ch parent given a child, subject to the right of
the other to visit, the parents being enjoined against
"interposing any obstacle or hindrance in the way of
the other'', the father took both of the minor children
to Montana and established a residence. It would seem
the child given to the mother's custody was returned
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without us,e of process. The mother, on such facts, obtained from the Nebraska Court a modification awarding her custody of both children; came with it to Montana, filed habeas corpus, and was met with the objection that she was not a fit person to have custody, being
addicted to the use of drugs. The Montana. trial court
struck out this pleading, and awarded the child to the
mother.
In an original proceeding to vacate the order, the
appellant court disregarded the father's, contention that
''since the award in the original decree did not in terms
prohibit him from removing the son to Montana, he was
at liberty to establish his own domicile in Montana, and
thus that of the son, and having done so, it was incumbent upon the district court to determine the question
of custody without reference to the amendment made
to the decree by the Nebraska court''. It held that the
Omaha deeree was entitled to the protection of the ''full
faith and credit clause", and that the provisions of the
original decree were ''tantamount to a direction to him
to keep the son within the jurisdiction of the court whose
ward he was"; citing the Campbell case a.s authority.
:mven where no divorce was involved, in Allison v.
Bryan, (109 P. 935) a Kansas case, the father of an
illegitimate child, who had taken it into his home and
legitimatized it, was adjudged in contempt for failure
to obey the order of the Court granting the mother
rights of visitation, even though she had taken possession
of the child and gone with it to Oklahoma, losing custody
there upon a habeas corpus brought by the father. In
Cole v. Sp. Ct. (151 P. 169) a mother who refused to comply with the father's request, for a visit from his child
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as provided in a decree giYing the mother c.ustody wa.s
held to be in contempt of the California Court and in
Cole Y. Addison (58 P. ~d, 1013) an Oregon decision,
"'"here the "ife obtained custody in a divorce action
"\Yhich gaYe the husband the right to visit the c.hild at
all reasonable times, and "\Yhere provisions for support
were contractual, the Court held that the mother
breached the contract by taking the ehild to live with
her in New York and not sending it back for visits with
the father as agreed upon, and lost any right of recovery under the contract for support moneys..
Last under her Point No. II, appellant comp~lains
that her fine is gTeater than that permitted under Title
45 of the Civil Code. That is shortly answered for, in
the first place, we do not have here any fine, that being
a penalty payable to the State, and not a mere deprivation of the right of process, and to the claim that such
a penalty is all that may be imposed on a party in contempt to enforce compliance, we may point to the wide
use of such means of coercion in case after case we
have cited, going even to deprivation of custody. The
defendant in MacPherson v. MacPherson, (89 P. 2d
382) had been fined the limit, ordered jailed for the
maximum amount permitted by the California statutes
on civil contempt, and ordered to pay very large sums
for the use of his former wife in her future attempts
to recover from his custody of the children to which she
was entitled, and with whom he had fled from the state
to Mexico. When, on his appeal from the order requiring him to supply the means of litigation to his adversary, he was met with a motion to strike his appeal,
because he then was in continuing contempt, he likewise
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pleaded that, having been penalized all the statute on
contempt permitted, no additional penalty could be imposed on him. The Court said :
''There is no language in Section 1218 which in
any way places a limitation upon the power of
the Courts to refuse a hearing to contumacious
litigants. (Quoting the statute fixing fine and
time of imprisonment.) This statute will not
be construed to infringe upon the· court's inherent
power to ignore the demands of litigants who
persist in defying the legal orders and processes
of the s,tate. ''
The matter is not worth further labor.
Holding in mind the rule heretofore quoted from
17 Am. Jur. 516, and supported by the cases we have
cited, as well as inferentially by some of appellant's
cas,es, that the court has power to coerce, as for con..
tempt, the parent with custody who denies to the other
parent reasonable rights of visitation, which coercion
may be by withholding enforcements of rights otherwise
enforcible by the custodian and arising under the same
decree, or by punishment for contempt, we must turn to
another point, since the questions are much intermingled:
Point No.3. REDU·CTION OF FUTURE INSTALLMENTS OF SUPPORT MONEYS WAS
WITHIN THE DISCRETIONARY
POWER OF THE COURT UNDER THE
CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES OCCASIONED BY REMOVAL OF THE CHILDREN FROM UTAH.
I

Much of what we ha.ve said and many of the citations
made under our last point are applicable here. For if
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the Court may 'Yithhold payment of support moneys
while the custodian, entitled to them, is in contempt of
another part of the order, the right to modify the
amounts payable, to conform to the circumstances arising
from taking- the child from the stn te, is equally clear, and
is in fact a milder aspect of the use of the power of
coercion. There simply is nothing c.ontrary to this in
the citations made from the Utah cases and other
authorities referred to on pages. 5 and 6 of appellant's
brief.
The rule of course is that modification may be had
only under a. change in circumstances. What more
change of circumstances is required than the showing
made here. As the Michigan court said in Myers v.
Myers, (106 N.W. 403), where exactly this same question
was raised:
''If any change of circumstances, or new facts
arising since the decree were necessary to be
shown, they may be found in the prolonged absence of the daughter from the state of Michigan,
and the inability to visit guaranteed to defendant by the contract, with no assurance that the
daughter will ever return to the state.''
Certainly there is no assurance here that the Baker
children will ever return to Utah-most certainly they
will not if the appellant can prevent it. The later cas·e
of Meyers v. Meyers (supra) approves the language
quoted. Both were cases ·where a stipulation providing
for rights of visitation by the father had not been followed in the decree, and the Court first modified the
decree to include it, and then cut off support moneys
due under it for breach of the agreement. Waive as to
this the fact that the Court found impairment of respondent's financial standing to have occurred. If the
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worst comes to .the worst, he can let his ruined property
stand idle, can fail in his tractor payments and lose itcan even lose his insurance through non-payment of the
loan thereon. But these changed circumstanc.es appeared. Before the Thanksgiving period in 1948, he
had only to walk, or ride a bus, or take a. few minutes
ride in a. taxicab to see his children. Now he must
travel some 800 miles, must lose, as the Court found
from strong supporting evidence, approximately $100.00
in time and expense each time he pays a visit to his
children. That is a well defined change in circumstances,
and one created by the act of the appellant.
Not only do cases already referred to herein give
instances of modification, with removal the factor principally or solely creating change in circumstances; but
appellant under her point IV gives citation to other
instances::
In Feinberg v. Feinberg, 66 Atl. 611) the New
Jersey chancellor as quoted by appellant at page 19 of
her brief, refused to relieve against support moneys already accrued, upon the ground that the father should
have asked modification when new conditions arose.
(Which Baker did.) But appellant should have called
this Court's attention to what followed:
In this case it appears that the mother with custody,
subject to rights of visitation, took the child to Pittsburgh, some 250 to 300 miles from most New Jersey
points. Some· suggestion had been made that she would
be willing to set up a' residential domicile for the child in
Philadelphia, and readily accessible from all points in
that state. The chancellor gave time to the parties to
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file additional affidavits respecting the effect of such a
residence, and reserved for decision, until any such new
affidavits 'Yere available, the question:
'' \Vnether an order should be made diseontinuing
the payments until the minor is returned to the
jurisdiction, or ".,.hether the order should permit
the minor to be maintained in Philadelphia, with
the right of visitation specified in the decree
fully protected.''
In Zirkle v. Zirkle, (172 N.E. 19·2), an Indiana case
cited by appellant under Point IV of her brief, the
minor at the time of the divorce was not within the jurisdiction of the Indiana court of divorce jurisdiction, and
thereafter was taken from the state. The court denied
the right of the father to withhold payments of support
moneys after that removal,-it is not clear to what extent this was based upon the fact that the child was
never in the jurisdiction of the divorce court-.hut, as
quoted by appellant, pointed out that the father had the
remedy of asking for modification of the decree so that
it would require return of the child to the court's jurisdiction or the state.
In Altschuler v. Altschuler (284 N.Y.S. 93) the
court pointed out that the father, whose ex-wife had
removed with their child to California and so violated
the provisions of the decree, had the remedy of securing
a modification of the decree as to payment of moneys
to her thereunder.
Point No.4. MONETARY LOSS TO APPEL,LANT IS
NOT OBJECTIONABLE AS WITHHOLDING MONEYS FROM CHILDREN.
29
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While we do not quarrel with a rule broadly stated,
that a divorce does not sever the parent's responsibilities
towards his or her children, to argue, as does appellant,
that reduction in support moneys payable to the mother
with custody is equivalent to stealing the bread from
the children's mouths somewhat overstates the case.
The order fixing the amount which the divorced parent
must contribute to the support of the children does not
make the moneys paid the moneys of the children, nor
is there an obligation on the part of the parent custodian
to account for expenditure thereof, nor to ·show that all
re-ceived was expended on the children alone. The converse is also true, the parent with custody may not
hold the other parent for moneys spent for the upkeep
of the children in excess of the amount ordered paid by
the Court:
Adair v. Court (Ariz.) 33 P. 2d 995.
Under our laws, as well as those of California, the
parents are jointly and severally liable for the expenses
of the family and the education of the children. (Utah
Code Ann. 1943, 40-2-9), and a wife who receives a
property settlement, in lieu of alimony, is not thereby
absolved from bearing such part of the burde~ of tlie
upbringing of the children as the Court does not place
on the father. To shift a part of that burden from the
father to the mother, for such time as the mother persists in conduct calculated to estrange the children from
their father, is a means of coercion of the spouse guilty
of such conduct well within the powers and the discretion
of the trial court.·
''The mother is charged equally with the child's
father to protect nurture and educate their infant
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prog·eny. (Citing Civil Code). The award of
Nancy's custody to appellant and the requirement that respondent pay money for her support did not absolYe appellant from a parent's
obligation.-After spurning the court's decree by
removing Nancy from the state she was in no
better position to demand a continuance of respondent's contribution to the child's support
than she would have been had the father been
removed from this mundane sphere.-She- now
argues for her own advantage while pretending
an interest solely for the child. But protestations in behalf of the daughter are unavailing
for the reason that, in the absence of a. showing
that the child is in need, she will not be considered a party to the proceeding.''
White v. White (Cal.} 163 P. 2d 89

•

To the same effect are substantially all of the citations and cases we have previously discussed herein,
where the question involved conduct of the wife, involving impairment of rights of visitation, and a change of
custody was not asked including 17 Am. Jur. 516 (R.
Br. 19), Eberhart v. Eberhart (R. Br. 19), Weinbaum v.
Weinbaum (R. Br. 20), Meyers v. Meyers (R. Br. 21),
Harris v. Harris, (R. Br. 22), Schweig v. Sehweig (R.
Br. 23), Cole v. Addison (R. Br. 25), Myers v. Myers
(R. Br. 27), Feinberg v. Feinberg (R. Br. 28), and
Altschuler v. Altschuler (R. Br. 29), in each of which
coercion of the custodian, to performanc.e of her
duty to the court and the other parent, by withholding
of support moneys was either permitted, or so discussed as to show it to be considered a remedy open
to the Court and the parent, whose rights to see his
children had been defeated by the custodian's conduct.
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It seems significant that none of the cases cited
by appellant squarely holds that a reduction or complete termination of payment of support money is not
proper, where the children are taken far from the
domicile of the divorce, where they are estranged from
the father, and his chances of seeing them, holding or
winning back their affection, have been thwarted by
such removal. We have discussed everything cited by
appellant, except Hatch v. Hatch (192 A. 241), Thomas
v. Thomas (233 Ill. App. 488) and Heimbold v. Heimbold (217 N.Y.S. 379), the latter two cases referred to
in the eitation she gives on page 22 of her brief from
88 A.L.R. 200; and the citation on page 21 from 20
A.L.R. 838.
The Hatch case goes to the rule that vested payments of alimony may not be reduced by retrospective
modification of the decree ; the Heimhold case holds
simply that, with the divorced wife a resident, the
remedy of the father deprived of rights of visitation is
an appeal to the court to enforce his right, and not withholding of payments due from him; In the· Thomas case
the Court says that the father is not relieved of all
liability for the support of his children by his wife's
interference with his rights of visitation-and the A.L.
R. text gives a somewhat extreme statement as to the
considerations surrounding the appointment of custodians of minors. None of these citations hit the bullseye
at which appellant aims.
This resolves itself down to the question
the children are harmed by the action of
Significantly again, there is no testimony
Baker which even hints upon their lacking

of whether
the Court.
from Mrs.
any of the

32
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

necessaries of life. She spe-aks, as we have noted under
Point No. 1, of their being- happy, better off at Nyssa
than they had been in Ogden, and this in spite of the
fact that only $50.00 had been paid on support moneys
bet,veen November lOth, 1948, and the time of trial
eig·ht months later. She O\Yned a residence in West
Ogden, (B. of E. 19) and had received in the divorce
(Tr. 019) Ogden property, which had some indebtedness on it, both of \vhich she had sold. She had $50.00
a month coming in from sale of oneof her properties (B.
of E:. 26), and it would seem paid $25.00 a month on the·
balance on the Nyssa property (B. of E. 29) and $26.67
on debts on the Utah property, but from her other property, sold for $7,500.00, (B. of E:. 30), she received
$100.00 a month. She had with her an unmarried
daughter who paid her $35.00 a month for room and
board. In other words with the $60.00 monthly payable by respondent, $150.00 monthly from her Utah
properties, less $53.00 payable upon the Nyssa home
and one of the properties sold, and $35.00 from the
unmarried daughter, Mrs. Baker has had since entry
of the order herein about $190.00 a month to use, and
of course has had no rents to pay. She says she had
reserves (B. of E. 26) for her use during the period
when no support moneys came in. Obviously she had
good reason for not contending that the children had
been suffering for want of the support money, and for
not protesting that the children would suffer if the decree was modified by reducing support moneys, as respondent had asked.
And equally obviously, the Court rightly held that
she, and not the children, had suffered from the withholding of support.
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We submit that, on this record, the Court had open
to it, in its judicial discretion, the power to withhold
means of collecting through the Court's process moneys
due her, and of reducing the moneys payable to her
during the period of her continuing contempt.
Point No.5. THE COURT WAS NOT REQUIRED TO
DENY RES P 0 ND E NT REiLIEF BECAUSE OF DEFAULT IN PAYMENTS
DUE FROM HIM.
This is the converse of Appellant's Point III. The
only authority cited by appellant under that point which
sustains her proposition is the last sentence from 27
C. J. S. 1239, there quoted (Br. 17) to the effect that
''defendant's application to set aside order for maintenance of children, or reduction of award will not be
considered until he pays all arrears due under the original dec.ree. '' As sole authority that text cites in a
footnote Cooper v. Cooper, (N. J.) 143 A. 559.
The Cooper case concerned a chronic evader of responsibilites to his -children, imposed by a divorce decree,
whose reasons for asking reduction of amounts payable the Court seemed to care little for. The· decision
is contrary to the Feinberg ruling-- and is not good law
in New Jersey or elsewhere.
The correct rule on such matters is as follows:
"Where a husband seeks a reduction of alimony,
the fact that he resists the payment of what has
accrued does not compel the court to refuse a
reduction but is a circumstance· justifying the
refusal of a reduction.'' 1g, C. J. 277.
''If the existence of accrued and unpaid alimony
should be held to absolutely prevent the court
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from altering, reducing, or altogether abrogating· future installments of alimony, then it would
result that, in cases of pecuniary inability of the·
defendant to pay and discharge all arrea.rages
of alimony, the court would be powerless to
grant relief as to future and further alimony,
no matter 'Yhat the ehanged conditions of the
parties in the property, or how loudly the facts
and circumstances might call for the equitable
intervention of the Court. The hands of a court
of equity are not thus bound". Craig v. Craig,
(Ill.), 45 N. E. 153-cit. p. 154.
The Craig case next above .is one cited by app·ellant under Point III of her brief. She there cites also
Wassung v. Wassung (Nebr.) 286 N. W. 349
Kell v. Kell (Ia.) 161 N. W. 636
Delbridge v. Sears (Ia.) 160 N. W. 218
Van Loon v. Van Loon (Fla.) 182 So.

?.0~

in each of which the court either granted modification
as to future payments of alimony at a time when the
petitioner was in default on payments already accrued,
or, in one instance, referred the matter to a referee to
determine what modification was justified.
The Utah case of Myers v. Myers (62 Utah 90, 218
P. 123), and the other cases cited by appellant under
this point are authority for the rule stated in the first
part of the quote from 27 C. J. S. 1239, on page 17 of
her brief, to-wit: that an installment of moneys once
due may not be cancelled out by a subsequent modification of the decree. They have no reference to questions
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of withholding relief from those in contempt. If appellant were right, this Court should strike her appeal,
since she makes no showing of any attempt to purge
herself of her wrongful conduct.
Point No.6: THE COURT DE,NIED APPELLANT'S
REQUEST FOR 'MODIFICATION OF
THE DECRE'E TO PERMIT CONTINUED RESIDENCE IN OREGON, AND
WAS NOT REQUIRED TO AFFORD
HE.R AN OPPORTUNITY TO PURGE
HERSELF OF CONTEMPT.
!

The facts surrounding the- two matters above referred to, which appellant urges as her Points V and
VI, are so essentially the same that one argument is
enough for hoth.
When this ca.se closed, the status of appellant as
to her intention to remain in Oregon had not changed.
She had pleaded, as we have seen, that it was absolutely
necessary for her to live there, and the nearest she had
come showing willingness to right the wrong she had
done respondent was· her offer to bring or send down
the children, onee or twice a year (B. of E. 25) if oppor•
tunity served. She continued to persist in her wrongful
conduct.
There may he instances where a court of equity
should afford one in contempt the oportunity to right
the wrong and escape punishment, but not so when the
contemner pleads and by testimony shows her intention
to p·ersist. Where a continuing penalty attends persistence in the contempt, the contemner may accept the
penalty, and continue the conduct, or escape the penalty
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by conforming to the decree, and asking restoration of
rig·hts. The opportunity to purg-e her contempt, which
appellant says has been denied her, has always heen
and is still open to her. Upon her return to U tab, the
principal reason for reduction of her monthly payments,
the added expense of visitation imposed on the respondent,-\\"ill terminate. If she then shows willingness to
afford reasonable rights of visitation to respondent, the
Court would feel that a large part, if not all, of grounds
for reduction in support moneys was gone-and could
not, as we see it, refuse her appropriate relief as. to enforcement of her judgment for past due sums. Of
course, if respondent had not the means to pay in full,
it could afford him time in which to make up the hack
payments. .

The Court, as the cases show, might well have directed her to bring the children back to Utah and, imposed, as penalty for nQn-compliance, loss of custody
or complete loss of assistance towards support of the
children. (Such an order as to change of custody probably, in view of the Oregon decision on that point, would
have not been enforcible.) Appellant complains of the
leniency rather than of the severity of the Court. The
fa~t is, of course, that the Court simply accepted the
situation as Mrs. Baker had made it, and tried to equitably adjust the matter so that the respondent would
still he able to visit his children but with a part of his
expense carried by appellant. From a practical point
of view, that leavBs appellant open to retain her Nyssa
residence and accept the penalties, or return and avoid
them.
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To have modified the dec.ree as she asked would
have been to approve her conduct. The court might
have done so, had .circumstances justified it. But such
justification must have been clearly established, based
on factors affecting the best interests of the children,
and not merely beneficial to the mother. The Court
did not accept her contention that removal to Nyssa was
required by the children's best interests. The whole
reeord shows that it was only the mother's interests
and desires which occasioned it.
The legal presumption prevailing when other circumstances are relatively weak against it, is that the
welfare of the children is promoted by their residence
in the jurisdiction of the court whose wards, by force
of the divorce proceeding, they have become. So situated, they are where the Court may give better supervision of .their affairs, and better· determine matters
as to their welfare if questions arise.
McGonigle v. McGonigle, (Colo.) 151 P. 197
In Re Hipple, (Supra.)
Busser v. Busser, /(Okla.) 296 P. 401
Stirett v. Stirett, (Wyo.) 248 P. 1015
Williams v. Williams, (Colo.) 147 P. 2d 477
20 A. L. R. 840-under note cited by appellant,
(Br. 21)
The MeGonigle case says : '' It is against the policy
of the law to permit its ( a child of divorced parents)
removal unless its well being and future welfare demand it." The A. L. R. note cites cases to the same
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effect. The last t'Yo cases are among- a number of decisions "·hich sn8tain requirements that custodians, desiring to remoYe children from the judisdiction, may be
required to giYe substantial bound to insure their return.
We submit that there are no factors here which
required the court to regularize appellant's wrongdoing.
Point No. 7. THE COURT PROPERLY REJECTED
TESTI~IONY ON MATTERS PREVIOUSLY LITIGATED AND DETERMINED.
At the trial, appellant, without requesting modification of the decree as to rights of visitation, and
without pleading the matter so that respondent would
be apprized and prepared to meet it, tendered evidence
as to matters, occurring prior to the trial of the original divorce case, and apparently offered to show that
respondent was an unfit person to visit or have aught
to do with his children. The files in the divorce action
are part of the record before this court (B. of E. 33)
and show (Tr. 014) pleading by appellant that ~r.
Baker was an unfit person to have any care, custody
or control over his children by reason of ''his idea on
sex and his ideas with respect to society and economics.''
The finding on the divorce trial, {Tr. 018) are entirely wanting in any finding of his unfitness to have
the entire custody of the children placed in him, hut
award that custody to the mother solely because ''ever
since the respective births of the children, plaintiff
has had their care, custody and control.'' The case had
been contested, ( Tr. 021).
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The Court, upon this record, excluded the testimony as being matter which had been settled and determined by the trial, and not open to further litigation. Its ruling was in accordance with the law appellant urges under her Point I,-that decrees are not subject to modification except by a showing of matters
arising thereafter which invoke the equitable powers
. of the court. Had she filed a petition for modification
respecting visitation by the father, and showed some
ground for suppression of such evidence at the former
trial which sounded in fraud or overreaching, then and
then only, it might have been admissible.
The Court will not require argument that such
evidence, so offered, without notice, under circumstances likely to induce perjury, and on matters' where
·bare denial only would have been available to the other
party, would have been of little weight to a fair minded
judge, had it been received.
CONCLUSION
The judgment of the lower court should b~ confirmed.
That the Court should shift to- appellant a greater
part of the expense of maintenance of the children, and
should withhold from her the right to use the processes
of the Court while herself refusing rights given respondent thereunder is amply within the reasonable discretion of the Court, in cases of this character. Should
the lower court refuse to restore the rights withheld
upon due, showing of compliance, and of want of other
change in material factors, then this Court might well
listen to the plea now made.
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The theory that respondent had no standing in
c.ourt has been shown to be absolutely without foundation; appellant's plea for an order regularizing her
Oregon residence equally """anting in equitable considerations. We think the record free from reversible ·
error, and wanting in any considerations which would
lead an appellate court, having in mind the discretion pertaining to courts of the first instance in such
matters, to make any modification in the orders and
decree under consideration.
Respectfully submitted
Stuart P. Dobbs

of
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Attorneys for Respondent
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